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31. Introduction
Since 1973 the power of OPEC has been an important determinant in the global oil market. By
curbing its production the cartel has to a large degree managed to obtain high oil prices, presumably to
the benefits for their member countries, but even more so for producers outside OPEC. In the 1970s
oil prices were high, and OPEC’s market share was about one half. Pindyck (1978) then concluded
that OPEC’s cartelisation gains were tremendous. In the 1990s real oil prices have been halved
compared to the 1970s, while OPEC’s market share has shrunk to about 40 per cent. Thus, the market
situation seems to have changed to the worse for OPEC over the last 20 years, and one may ask
whether there still are cartelisation gains left in the current oil market. A persisting question for OPEC
should therefore be whether sustaining the cartel is advantageous, or whether the total revenue of the
OPEC-countries may be increased if the cartel is dissolved.1
Of course, with a given supply from other producers, OPEC as a whole could do no better than
utilising its market power. However, with more realistic assumptions about the behaviour of non-
OPEC, this may not hold universally. Moreover, even though OPEC as a group may benefit from
keeping the cartel alive, separate member countries may be tempted to break out in order to grasp the
free-rider gains to non-OPEC countries. Equador and Gabon did so in 1992 and 1996, respectively,
and this issue is certainly a difficult one for central member countries like Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and
the UAE. If the total gains from cartelisation are small, there is little to lose for single members by
leaving OPEC, i.e., the cartel is not a stable coalition.
In this paper we investigate whether OPEC profits from cartelisation in the current and the expected
future oil market. Moreover, we study how different moves by producers outside the cartel may
influence this gain. If, e.g., steps are taken to increase production or reserves of non-OPEC producers,
this may reduce or even erode the cartelisation gains, and may eventually lead to the collapse of
OPEC. The main losers from these events may ultimately be non-OPEC. We will also study whether
moves by consumer countries, like the introduction of global carbon taxes, may trigger a breakdown
of the cartel. If so, the environmental effect of the taxes may be undesirable, as global oil production
would probably increase.
There are several ways of modelling the game between a cartel and a fringe, of which the Nash-
Cournot approach and the Stackelberg approach are the most familiar. The former assumes that both
the fringe producers and the cartel take the supply of all other producers as given when deciding their
own production profile (Salant 1976). In a Stackelberg model with the cartel as a leader, the cartel
knows that the fringe reacts to its supply decisions, and takes this into account when choosing its
optimal production profile.
Thus, a powerful cartel would obviously follow the latter strategy if feasible, and, as indicated above,
the gains from cartelisation depends crucially on how the market power of OPEC is viewed. If
production from other producers are thought to be exogenously determined, or if the cartel’s role can
be described as being a Stackelberg leader, OPEC will never lose from its cartelisation. The cartel is
then able to choose between several strategies including a strategy giving the same outcome as a
                                                    
1
 This is illustrated by the title of a speech held by the Secretary General of OPEC: «Can OPEC survive?»
(Lukman 1996).
4competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, Ulph and Folie (1978)2 have shown that a cartel may
possibly be worse off in an open-loop Nash equilibrium than if the market is perfectly competitive.
The intuition behind this result is that if a cartel is dissolved, the supply from the cartel producers will
increase, lowering the price, which in turn induces the other producers to restrict their supply. Being a
cartel, however, implies that such a supply increase   may not be credible, which means that the fringe
will not be driven to restrict its supply. This applies in particular to a Nash equilibrium, where the
producers are supposed to take the other producers supply as given. Thus, there are no feasible Nash
strategies for the cartel leading to a competitive equilibrium. Hence, even though the cartel responds
optimally to the actual market situation, there is a possibility that breaking up the cartel may increase
its profits.
As shown by Ulph (1982), there are shortcomings with both the Nash and the Stackelberg solution
concepts, and the choice of concept should be endogenous to the model. One important shortcoming
with the Stackelberg solution is that the equilibrium may be dynamically inconsistent (Ulph 1982).
Moreover, it may be argued that OPEC has not enough credibility in the oil market to act as a market
leader in the term of Stackelberg. Hence, the Nash solution concept may seem more appropriate in the
current market situation. We therefore choose to concentrate on the Nash-Cournot model of a
dominant firm to calculate the open loop solution of the game.3 Moreover, as shown in Figures 1 and
2, initially the reference case of our model seems to fit well with the actual market conditions (the
reference case of the model is further documented in Berg et al. (1996)). It should be emphasised,
however, that the choice of solution concept is crucial for the results. 4
An important aspect of our model is the intertemporal behaviour of the supply side. Only recently has
this been implemented into some empirical energy models (e.g. Manne et al. (1995) (MERGE) and
Manne and Rutherford (1994) (extended version of Global 2100)). The relevance of such behaviour
may of course be discussed, but the alternative, i.e., ignoring future expectations, seems inappropriate
in the market of an exhaustible resource.
In Pindyck’s (1978) study mentioned above, the gains to OPEC from cartelisation were found to be
50-100 per cent, and potentially even higher. The study was based on market information from around
1975, i.e., just after the first oil shock in the 1970s. He used a model where the fringe acts in a static
manner, while the cartel operates intertemporally as a Stackelberg leader. In a later study Griffin
(1992) found that the return from cartelisation is about 25 per cent. This result is based on a simple
Hotelling model, and the choice of price path in the monolithic case seems somewhat ad hoc.
Compared to these two studies, our study utilises a more sophisticated model, particularly compared to
the model used by Griffin. The time schedule has also shifted, especially compared to Pindyck’s
study. Moreover, as opposed to the other studies, we also focus on how the cartelisation gains may be
altered by different moves by other producers or consumer countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section the model is briefly described. In section 3
we discuss the cartelisation profits in the current market. Then, the two subsequent sections deal with
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 According to Ulph (1982).
3 It can be shown that this Nash-equilibrium is time consistent, but not subgame perfect, see, e.g., Hoel (1992).
4 According to Teece (1982) and Gülen (1996) OPEC did not behave at all as a cartel until the early 1980’s. Yet
from 1982 Gülen finds evidence of co-ordination among the member countries. On the other hand, Griffin (1985)
and Youhanna (1994) find support for a partial market sharing cartel model in the periods 1971-1983 and 1983-
1989, respectively.
5effects of moves by producers outside OPEC; in section 4 production restrictions in Norway are
discussed, and in section 5 more general moves are discussed. The impacts on the cartelisation gains
of moves by consumer countries are studied in section 6. The paper ends with conclusions and policy
recommendations.
2. Model description
The model we apply is based on Berg et al. (1996), which models the international markets for fossil
fuels in an intertemporal and deterministic way. All prices and quantities at each point of time are
determined simultaneously in the model. Consumers determine their demand according to current
income and prices of the fuels, whereas producers determine their supply according to the market
conditions in all periods assuming perfect foresight. We focus on OPEC and the oil market in this
paper, while Berg et al. (1996) also discusses specific features of the coal and natural gas markets.
The demand for fossil fuels is divided into three regions, i.e., OECD-Europe, rest-OECD and non-
OECD. For each fuel the demand is represented by a log-linear function, which is decreasing in the
price of the fuel and increasing in the prices of the two other fossil fuels. Hence, the three fuels are
imperfect substitutes. The relevant price of a specific fuel by region equals the sum of the producer
price, costs due to transportation, distribution and refining, and the average net fuel tax.5 The demand
function changes exogenously over time due to economic growth. Moreover, we assume that there
exists a carbon free backstop technology (e.g., solar, wind or biomass) which serves as a perfect
substitute for fossil fuels. This means that if the consumer price of, e.g., oil exceeds the price of the
backstop technology, then no oil will be demanded.6 The backstop technology is available in copious
supply at a fixed price at each point of time in all regions. Over time, however, we assume that the
cost of applying the backstop technology is reduced by a constant rate to reflect technological change.
As fossil fuels are non-renewable resources, their allocation over time is important for the suppliers.
Extracting one more unit today changes the supply conditions in the future. Hence, a rational producer
will not only consider the current price or market condition. We therefore assume that the producers
maximise the present value of their resource wealth, i.e., they solve an intertemporal optimisation
problem.7
To analyse the gains from cartelisation, the international oil market is modelled in two different ways.
The cartel model describes a market with a cartel (corresponding to OPEC) and a competitive fringe
on the supply side, whereas the competitive model describes a competitive market with low (OPEC)
and high cost producers (non-OPEC), respectively. In the former specification, which corresponds to
the current market situation, the fringe always considers the oil price path as given, while the cartel
regards the price as a function of its supply.8 Hence, the marginal revenue for the fringe is equal to the
                                                    
5 As a result of a more integrated world economy, we assume that existing energy taxes and unit transportation,
distribution and refining costs for each fuel will be harmonised after 40 years to a global weighted average, using
initial demand as weights.
6
 This is of course a very simplifying, though common, assumption, especially because oil have alternative areas
of application than as a fuel.
7
 This is not done for coal, as the global coal reserves are so huge that the resource rent in coal extraction will
probably be marginal in the foreseeable future.
8
 An alternative approach is to consider a core of the cartel (i.e., consisting of Saudi Arabia and some other
central member countries), and assume that the rest of the cartel operates as price takers.
6price, whereas for the cartel marginal revenue is in general less than the price. As explained in the
introduction, we have chosen to model this market as a Nash-Cournot game.
We do not consider the resources as strictly exhaustible. However, the cost functions of both the cartel
and the fringe are assumed to be exponentially increasing functions of cumulative production. This
implies that unit costs approach infinity as cumulative production approaches infinity. Hence, at any
given price there is a limited amount of reserves that are economically valueable. The cost level of the
two producer groups differs, reflecting that extraction costs in OPEC generally are lower than in the
rest of the world. Moreover, the shape of the cost functions also differs, depending on initial reserves.
Furthermore, we assume that unit costs are reduced by a constant rate each year to reflect
technological change and new discoveries.
Some important parameter choices in the model should be mentioned. First, we assume a universal
discount rate of 7 per cent per year in both OPEC and non-OPEC. Second, the technological rate of
change is assumed to be 1 per cent in OPEC. In non-OPEC the rate is assumed to start at 2 per cent
due to major cost reductions lately, and then gradually fall to 1 per cent after 30 years. Finally, the
parameters in the cost functions are determined so that the marginal cost of the last unit of the current
oil reserve (BP 1995) equals $20 per barrel.
Further discussions of features of the model and numerical specifications are given in Berg et al.
(1996). A formal model description is found in the appendix.
3. Gains from cartelisation in the current oil market
To investigate OPEC’s profits from cartelisation, we compare the outcome of the cartel model with the
outcome of the competitive model. We start by briefly describing the reference scenarios in the two
models (see Berg et al. (1996) for a more detailed description). The price and production profiles in
both reference scenarios are illustrated in Figure 1 and 2.9 With the cartel model the real oil price starts
at $21 per barrel in the year 2000 and increases to $39 in 2040, which equals the maximum producer
price due to the backstop technology. Inititially, OPEC has a market share of about one-third, which is
somewhat less than their real market share in the current oil market. In the period 2030-2050 OPEC
gradually takes over the whole market.
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 The model operates with periods of ten years, so that, e.g., the year 2000 refers to average levels in the period
1995-2004. The maximum producer prices in the different regional markets are defined as the backstop price net
of regional transportation, distribution and refining costs, and regional taxes.
7Figure 1. Producer price of oil in the reference scenarios - cartel and competitive model
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Figure 2. Production of oil in OPEC and non-OPEC in the reference scenarios - cartel and
competitive model
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In a competitive market, the countries that currently constitute OPEC find it optimal to increase
production substantially (i.e., almost a quadrupling in the first period), as they are assumed to ignore
their own impact on the price. Hence, initially the oil price is reduced from $21 to $11 per barrel, and
non-OPEC is squeezed out of the market, see Figure 1 and 2 (the realism of this outcome is discussed
below). The effect on producers outside OPEC is clearly disastrous.
We notice that dissolving the cartel has significant impact on both the oil price and the fringe prod-
uction. Clearly, for the OPEC-countries the break up has had a favourable influence on non-OPEC
production. The question is whether or not OPEC gains from this, i.e., whether or not its oil wealth has
8increased. The wealth is defined as the present value of the net revenue, i.e., price minus unit cost
times production. In the cartel model OPEC’s oil wealth is found to be $ 4,030 billions. In the
competitive model, however, the oil wealth of OPEC as a group is reduced to $ 3,431 billions.10
Thus, according to our results, there are still positive gains from cartelisation in the current oil market
(i.e., 17.5 per cent).11 The results seem to underpin earlier results found by Griffin (1992), who, based
on a much simpler model, found that the gains from cartelisation are 25 per cent. However, compared
to the results of Pindyck (1978), who found cartelisation gains of at least 50-100 per cent around 1975,
we may conclude that the profits of being a cartel have been considerably reduced. This result reflects
the change in market situation described in the introduction.12 Thus, being a cartel may no longer seem
an obvious strategy in economic terms for the OPEC-countries.
It should be emphasised that the model we apply is a long term equilibrium model, and the reference
scenario of the competitive model presented should be viewed as a hypothetical long term scenario.
Hence, the model does not present short term effects of an eventual break up of OPEC. In reality
production in non-OPEC will only gradually be reduced, as the main costs are sunk capital costs.
Moreover, it may take time for OPEC-countries to build up capacity from their current levels. Thus,
the ultimate impact on the initial price level will depend on the flexibility of OPEC and non-OPEC
production. Moreover, demand is more inelastic in the short run, which means that an increased
supply will have difficulties being sold in the nearest future. This puts further downward pressure on
the initial price level. It is difficult to conclude in which direction these short term effects go. If non-
OPEC production is inflexible and short term demand is inelastic, the cartelisation gains are
presumably higher than indicated above, as the price is forced further down if OPEC breaks up.
However, if OPEC’s capacity is somewhat inflexible, this may actually be a gain for the OPEC-
countries as a whole, as production is not increased too much.
As the gains from cartelisation seem to be modest for OPEC as a whole, there is a clear temptation for
individual countries to withdraw from the cartel. Equador did so in 1992, and Gabon has recently done
the same. If a single member country has the option to produce more than the agreed quota, the direct
gains of increasing production, e.g., by leaving the cartel or cheating on its quota, may be large.
However, the country has to bear in mind that its behaviour may trigger a dissolvement of the cartel,
which ultimately may lead to a loss for the country. According to our analyses, this loss is not very
serious, and hence in this regard the cartel may be characterised as relatively unstable. The production
increases in Venezuela over the last year seem to support this conclusion.
For producers outside OPEC this picture is probably alarming. Our model simulations indicate a loss
of 71 per cent of their oil wealth if OPEC breaks down as a cartel. This is due to much lower oil
prices, which makes the relatively expensive non-OPEC production almost unprofitable initially.
Thus, they should indeed care about how their behaviour may influence OPEC’s future role in the oil
market. That is what the rest of this paper discusses.
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 The numbers that are referred are of course highly dependent on some key parameters, like the choice of
discount rate, and should be interpreted with caution. However, we focus on the comparison of the two models
under identical parameter choices. For a comparison, Griffin (1992) finds that the net present value of OPEC’s
oil resources are about twice as high as our figures. This is probably due to much higher oil prices.
11
 This result is robust to, e.g., increases in the discount rate, which presumably is a pivotal parameter.
12
 The discrepancy may of course also be due to modelling differences.
94. The effects of reductions in the Norwegian oil production
The North Sea is an expanding region in oil production, illustrated by the fact that 62 per cent of the
increase in non-OPEC production from 1990 to 1994 came from higher production in Norway (35 per
cent) and the United Kingdom (27 per cent), see BP (1995), and a further rise in North Sea production
is expected. As a result, OPEC applies pressure to these two countries to lower their production, war-
ning that the implication of increased North Sea supply may be that the cartel loosens its production
quotas, or, in the worst case, ceases to restrict production. Thus, it is of interest to study whether this
warning has a root in economic rationality, i.e., whether a reduction in North Sea production increases
the cartelisation gains for OPEC, so that a disorganisation of OPEC is prevented.
In this analysis, we look specifically at a reduction in Norwegian extraction, which we for the time
being assume to be exogenous. The other fringe producers, however, are modelled as before. In the
planning scenario, we assume that the Norwegian oil production follows the scenarios of the Nor-
wegian Government, see Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Energy (1996). This extraction path
includes oil fields currently in production, oil fields decided to be put into production, discoveries
under consideration, production due to better resource utilisation, and prospects. In the reduction
scenario we assume that this production is reduced by one third in the first period (1995-2004),
corresponding to 1 million barrel per day, and by one sixth in the next period (2005-2014) corre-
sponding to a reduction of about 0.6 million barrels per day. However, total cumulative production in
Norway is the same in the two scenarios, which in the end implies an increase in the Norwegian
production in the reduction scenario compared to the planning scenario, i.e., the production profile in
the former scenario is somewhat flatter, see Figure 3.
Figure 3. Production of oil in Norway - two alternative scenarios
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Figure 4 shows the difference between the producer price of oil in the two scenarios, with OPEC being
a cartel. The price increase due to reduced Norwegian production is relatively small, i.e., $0.15 per
barrel. However, note that the price path of the reduction scenario is always above the price path of the
planning scenario, even though the Norwegian production increases from 2020 onwards in the
reduction scenario. The reason is that in response to a higher oil price with reduced Norwegian supply,
10
the rest of the fringe (ROF) increases production initially by 0.75 million barrels per day. However,
due to the intertemporal aspects of the model, increased current production gives higher future costs,
and lower future production. The changed Norwegian production profile therefore leads to an almost
equivalent opposite change in the production profile of ROF. The ROF production is very price
sensitive, initially 75 per cent of the Norwegian reduction is offset by increased production in ROF.
This active response from ROF means that there is little room for OPEC to exploit the reduced North
Sea supply. The cartel increases its production initially by 0.04 million barrels of oil, which means
that 79 per cent of the Norwegian production decline is offset by increased production from other
producers, i.e., a leakage rate of 79 per cent in 2000. Thus, while the production of ROF is very price
sensitive, OPEC chooses to keep production rather unchanged to obtain somewhat higher prices.
OPEC’s oil wealth increases only marginally, i.e., by 0.6 per cent, with a flatter Norwegian production
profile. The reason is of course that the ROF to a large degree counteracts the change in Norwegian
supply.
Figure 4. Oil price increase in reduction scenario compared to planning scenario
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In section 3 we observed that in a competitive equilibrium, it would not have been optimal for the
fringe to produce at all in the first 10-years period. Thus, the two alternative Norwegian production
profiles described in Figure 3 may seem a bit irrelevant in the competitive scenarios.13 We therefore
assume that if OPEC were dissolved as a cartel, we would have the competitive equilibrium earlier
shown in Figures 1 and 2, i.e., with Norway as an integrated part of the fringe, no matter what the
Norwegian production profile looks like with OPEC being a cartel. This means that the cartelisation
gains only depend on the different outcomes of the Nash Cournot model, as the outcome of the
competitive model is fixed.
Therefore, as OPEC’s oil wealth in the cartel model is somewhat increased with a more conserving
Norwegian production profile, the cartelisation gains also rise. However, as the wealth increase is
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 Of course, as explained in section 3, in the short term production in non-OPEC is not as flexible as indicated
by our model results. Short term effects are discussed later in this section.
11
small, the impact on the cartelisation gains is also small, i.e., from 17.3 to 18.0 per cent. Thus, a more
conserving Norwegian production profile may slightly increase the profitability of OPEC, but
probably not as much as to influence OPEC’s future market role. This indicates that although
psychological aspects should play a role in this matter, OPEC’s warning to the North Sea producers
may be somewhat groundless, and rather hide the fear of losing revenues.14
Short term inflexibilities that are not captured by the model may however lead to a greater shift in the
oil price than indicated above, when Norwegian production is reduced initially. We now take a closer
look at one of the short term effects, i.e., we assume that the ROF production is totally inflexible, and
thus unchanged, in the first three periods, while total non-OPEC production (including Norway) is
adjusted optimally from period four onwards. This scenario is called the new reduction scenario.15
OPEC is assumed to have idle capacity and therefore responds optimally to reduced North Sea
extraction.
Figure 5. Oil price increase in new reduction scenario compared to planning scenario
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Figure 5 shows the changes in the producer price of oil when the ROF production meets an upper
limit. The effect on the oil price is considerable compared to the scenario in Figure 4. Initially, a
reduction of 1 million barrel of oil per day from the North Sea increases the price by $0.64 per barrel.
However, the difference between the planning scenario and the new reduction scenario diminishes
with time, and the oil price in the reduction scenario will in this case fall below the planning scenario
price between 2020 and 2040. This is due to increased production in the fringe, including Norway, in
this period.
                                                    
14 Actually, Norwegian oil wealth is also increased in the reduction scenario, i.e., by 14 per cent or 67 billlion
NOK. Thus, according to the model there seems to be joint benefits to OPEC and the North Sea producers if this
scenario is chosen.
15 In this case the planning scenario is identical to the reference scenario of the cartel model described in section
3. That is, Norway is not modelled independently of the ROF, as in first part of this section.
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As the ROF production is unchanged initially, OPEC increases its production slightly more in this
scenario, by 0.18 million barrels per day, giving a total leakage rate by 18 per cent. However, in order
to defend the oil price, OPEC’s production is reduced significantly between 2030 and 2050 when non-
OPEC production increases. In this reduction scenario the oil wealth of OPEC is increased by 1.8 per
cent, which is slightly more than under the previous reduction scenario above. Again, taking the
competitive scenario as given, the cartelisation gains increase from 17.5 to 19.5 per cent. That is, this
short term effect of a more conserving North Sea extraction may reduce the temptation for OPEC-
countries to break up the cartel. However, the increase in cartelisation gains is still relatively small.
5. The effects of more general moves by non-OPEC
In this section we generalise the discussion in the previous section by focusing on more general moves
by non-OPEC producers, and how such moves may influence the cartelisation gains to OPEC. We are
especially interested in whether there are realistic assumptions about the fringe behaviour under which
the cartelisation gains become negative, so that it may be profitable for OPEC to disintegrate.
Morever, if the cartelisation profits are greatly diminished, but still positive, it might also induce the
disintegration of OPEC for at least three reasons. First, it is possible that when the total cartelisation
gains are small, for certain member countries the gains may be negative. Second, even a small gain
may not be enough to conquer the temptation of grasping the free-rider gains to competitive
producers. Third, we neither take account of costs associated with cartelisation such as political costs,
costs of coordinating output and price and the costs to the individual cartel members stemming from
the risk of being undercut and losing significant short term profits, see Pindyck (1978). These costs
may be significant and may thus outweigh the cartelisation gains under certain conditions, making it
difficult for OPEC to maintain cartel discipline when the gains from adhering to the cartel rules are
small.
The changes in the fringe behaviour are brought about by different assumptions about the discount
rate of the fringe producers, the rate of technological change outside OPEC and the reserve bases of
the fringe. (In the next section we look at the impact of moves by consumer countries.) The results are
summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1. OPEC’s oil wealth and cartelisation gains with different moves by non-OPEC
Parameter1 OPEC oil wealth in billion $ Cartelisation
gains (per cent)
Scenario R22 T23 C24 Nash Cournot
model
Competitive
model
Reference/competitive
scenario 0.07 0.02 0.025 4,030 3,431 17.5
SCEN 1 0.10 3,769 3,183 18.4
SCEN 2 0.15 3,561 3,008 18.4
SCEN 3 0.20 3,463 2,932 18.1
SCEN 4 0.03 3,715 3,182 16.8
SCEN 5 0.05 3,160 2,678 18.0
SCEN 6 0.07 2,692 2,258 19.2
SCEN 7 0.020 3,421 3,127 9.4
SCEN 8 0.015 2,778 2,745 1.2
SCEN 9 0.010 2,039 2,305 -11.5
SCEN 10 0.20 0.020 2,848 2,642 7.8
SCEN 11 0.20 0.015 2,269 2,260 0.4
SCEN 12 0.07 0.020 2,163 1,941 11.4
SCEN 13 0.07 0.015 1,594 1,578 1.0
1
 We enter the parameter estimates only where they differ from the reference scenario assumptions.
2
 R2 - discount rate of non-OPEC
3
 T2 - initial technological change in non-OPEC
4
 C2 - convexity parameter for non-OPEC
5.1. Changes in the discount rate of the fringe
The appropriate discount rate depends on whether the development rate of new oil fields are
determined by national governments or by the private oil industry, and the social and private discount
rates. In non-OPEC countries there seems to be a more or less mixed influence by governments and
private agents, whereas oil production in OPEC traditionally has been managed by the states.16 The
private industry generally demands a higher rate of return than the discount rate of societies, and they
also face the possibility of losing the property right of the resources they currently have in control.
However, several developing countries including major OPEC-countries face severe budget crises (see
e.g. Adelman (1993)), which implies that the need for current money may be overwhelming. Hence,
the social discount rate may also be high.
Based on the reasoning above, in the reference scenario both the fringe and the OPEC-countries are
assumed to have a discount rate of 7 per cent. However, if the trend towards more privatisation
continues outside OPEC, meaning that the oil resources are getting more or less controlled by private
companies, this rate may become too low for non-OPEC. Moreover, if the need for current money
becomes stronger due to budget crisis etc., this may also lead to a higher discount rate in non-OPEC.17
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 In the last years there has been a move towards more privatisation in some OPEC-countries, too, like
Venezuela.
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 Both these arguments may also be put forward for OPEC. If we assume that the discount rate of OPEC rather
than non-OPEC becomes higher, the relative cartelisation gains actually increase as the competitive outcome is
characterised by strongly depressed prices.
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We see from Table 1 (SCEN 1-3) that when the discount rate of the fringe is gradually increased from
7 to 20 per cent,18 the oil wealth of OPEC is reduced monotonically in both models. The reason why
the OPEC wealth is reduced is clearly seen from Figures 6-7. Figure 6a shows that when the discount
rate of the fringe is 20 per cent, the producer price of oil is well below the corresponding price in the
reference scenario in the first three periods. This is also the case with perfect competition, see Figure
7a. The price is lower initially because the higher discount rate for the fringe producers will induce
them to move production forward in time, see Figures 6c and 7c. According to the Hotelling rule for
optimal extraction of exhaustible resources, the price of oil must rise faster with a higher discount rate,
for the producer to be willing to postpone production to future periods.
From Figure 6b we see that in the Nash Cournot model OPEC reduces its production only marginally
in the early periods as a response to the change in non-OPEC behaviour. This means that OPEC does
not find it optimal to use its cartel power to reduce production in order to maintain a high price of oil.
The explanation for this might be that with an initial increase in non-OPEC production, the market
share of OPEC is reduced from 34.0 per cent in the reference scenario to 28.3 per cent in SCEN 3.
Hence, the cartel power has diminished, so that the gains from restricting supply have become smaller.
In the situation with perfect competition, the OPEC-countries take the price as given and reduce
production significantly in the second period as a response to increased non-OPEC production. With a
faster increase in the oil price this induces the OPEC-countries to delay production. However, as non-
OPEC still doesn’t produce in the first period, it is profitable for the OPEC-countries to move some
production to this period.
With OPEC’s market share being shrunk to less than 30 per cent with a discount rate of 20 per cent in
non-OPEC, one would naturally think that the cartelisation gains were diminished, too. However, as
OPEC’s oil wealth is negatively affected in both models, the impacts on the cartelisation gains are not
tremendous. The absolute cartelisation gains are somewhat reduced, i.e., by 11.6 per cent in SCEN 3
compared to the reference scenario. The relative cartelisation gains are, however, roughly the same.
Hence, the more offensive behaviour of non-OPEC does not seem likely to spur on the disintegration
of OPEC. This confirms the more specific conclusions reached in the previous section.
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 Higher discount rates probably imply higher unit costs, as investment costs are particularly important in oil
production. This is however not taken into account in the analyses, as cost data are taken directly from the
literature.
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Figure 6a. The producer price of oil under cartelisation
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Figure 6b. Oil production in OPEC under cartelisation
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Figure 6c. Oil production in non-OPEC under cartelisation
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5.2. Changes in technological progress outside OPEC
The technological progress has been impressive in some of the non-OPEC areas lately, notably in the
North Sea, where the estimates of economically valueable reserves have been revised upwards for
several fields. However, it is not certain that this progress will last for a very long time, and it is
questionable whether this progress will be apply to other parts of non-OPEC as the exploration areas
differ19. Thus, in the reference scenario we have assumed an initial rate of technological progress of 2
per cent p.a. in non-OPEC, which is gradually reduced to 1 per cent after 30 years.20
However, if governments and companies outside OPEC choose to invest large resources in R&D in
the oil sector, the technological progress may be faster than we have assumed in the reference scen-
ario. As OPEC’s share of the global reserves probably will become constantly higher in the years to
come, the OECD-countries might find the future oil market a bit frightening. Financing R&D in the oil
sector may therefore become a higher priority.21
Thus, we look at increases in the initial rate of technological change for the fringe producers, and
study the cartelisation gains in this case.22 From Table 1 (SCEN 4-6) we see that the oil wealth of
OPEC is reduced monotonically in both models when the technological progress in the fringe in-
creases. When the initial rate of technological change is 7 per cent, the oil wealth in OPEC is reduced
by one third in the Nash Cournot model. The same wealth reduction applies to the competitive model.
From Figures 6a and 7a we see that the producer price of oil is strictly lower than in the reference
scenario in all periods until the price reaches the maximum producer price.The reduction in the
resource wealth of OPEC is a result of the general cost reduction for the fringe producers implied by
the increased technological progress. The fringe will now produce a greater amount of oil at any given
price. From Figures 6c and 7c we see that when the initial rate of technological change is 7 per cent,
the fringe indeed produces more than in the reference scenario in all periods in both models. Thus,
there is a shift in the level of production, whereas the profile is quite unchanged, although the fringe
produces one period longer than in the reference case. This is different from the outcome of higher
discount rates in non-OPEC, as described in the previous subsection. In that case the production
profile of non-OPEC was changed, giving OPEC market dominance earlier than in the reference
scenario, whereas cumulative production was almost unchanged.
From Figure 6b we note that in the Nash Cournot model OPEC production is almost unchanged the
first 40 years by higher technological change in non-OPEC. This is the same reaction as with a higher
discount rate in non-OPEC, see the previous subsection. In the competitive model, however, OPEC
production in 2010 and 2020 is significantly reduced as OPEC loses some of the original cost
advantage, see Figure 7b.
Even though increased technological progress in non-OPEC severely reduces the oil wealth of OPEC,
as well as the cartel’s market share, the cartelisation gains are not particularly altered. The reason is of
course that the profitability of being competitive producers also diminishes. Since the wealth reduc-
tions are quite huge, however, the absolute cartelisation gains are reduced by 27.7 per cent in SCEN 6
compared to the reference scenario. However, the relative cartelisation gains are quite stable, so that
the relative importance of cartelisation is roughly the same as in the reference case.
Figure 7a. The producer price of oil under perfect competition
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 This is, e.g., discussed by four contributors in Oxford Energy Forum (1996).
20
 In OPEC we have assumed a constant rate of 1 per cent p.a.
21
 This argument may also be put forward for OPEC, as several OPEC-countries are getting more connected to
the international oil industry. If we assume that the initial technological rate of change is increased in OPEC
rather than non-OPEC, the cartelisation gains are increased. This is due to a higher market share for OPEC in this
case.
22 The technological change is still gradually reduced to 1 per cent after 30 years.
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Figure 7b. Oil production in OPEC under perfect competition
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Figure 7c. Oil production in non-OPEC under perfect competition
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5.3. Changes in non-OPEC reserves
In the reference scenario the shape of our cost functions are based on data from BP (1995) for proved
reserves, which indicates that the fringe has initial reserves of 239 billion barrels of oil, while OPEC is
endowed with 770 billion barrels, i.e., about three quarters of the global reserves. As pointed out in the
previous subsection, these circumstances may not be satisfactory for governments in the OECD-
countries. One strategy, then, may be to intensify the exploration activity outside OPEC, in order to
increase non-OPEC reserves. Thus, we would like to study whether such a move influences the
cartelisation gains to OPEC.
As explained in section 2, the cost functions are assumed to be exponentially increasing functions of
cumulative production, where the convexity parameter determines the slope of the function. This
parameter is determined so that the marginal production cost of the last unit of the current oil reserve
equals $20 per barrel. This choice reflects that there is no universal rule to estimate reserves, beyond
the vague definition «quantities which can be extracted under existing economic and operating
conditions». With the reserve estimates above, and initial unit costs of $10.9 and $3.3 per barrel in
non-OPEC and OPEC, the convexity parameters are respectively 0.025 and 0.023 in the reference
scenario. The similarities in these parameters reflect that the higher the initial reserves and unit cost,
the lower is the convexity parameter in the cost function.
We look at three different scenarios. A convexity parameter for non-OPEC of 0.020 implies an initial
amount of reserves equal to 300 billion barrels of oil, while 0.015 implies reserves of 400 billion barr-
els. Finally, a convexity parameter of 0.010 implies that non-OPEC has reserves of about 600 billion
barrels of oil, which is 2.5 times their current reserves. This last scenario seems rather unrealistic even
if there were a considerable amount of exploration activity outside OPEC. However, for purpose of
illustration the scenario is presented in the Figures 6-7.
Increasing the level of non-OPEC reserves is seen to have an important impact on the oil wealth of
OPEC, particularly in the Nash Cournot model. From Table 1 (SCEN 7-9) we see that the resource
wealth of OPEC decreases monotonically when the reserves of non-OPEC increases, i.e., when the
convexity parameter of the fringe decreases. This is a similar conclusion as in the previous sub-
sections.
However, whereas the relative cartelisation gains have been quite stable in the foregoing analyses, in
this case the profitability of being a cartel is greatly affected. We see from Table 1 that if the initial oil
reserves of non-OPEC are assumed to be 300 billion barrels, i.e., an increase of 25 per cent, the
cartelisation gains are halved. Moreover, with initial reserve estimates being increased to 400 billion
barrels, the gains become almost zero.23 Finally, with an initial non-OPEC reserve of 600 billion
barrels of oil the cartelisation gains have become negative and the OPEC members would receive a
higher resource wealth if they would disintegrate and act as price takers in the oil market.
The intuition behind these results is that as the reserves of non-OPEC producers are expanded, they
increase production of oil in all periods of exctraction, see Figures 6c and 7c. OPEC thus loses market
shares. The price effect of supply restrictions in OPEC is consequently smaller and thus the gains of
cartelisation to OPEC members are smaller. In the Nash Cournot model the change in OPEC supply is
only minor in the first four periods, see Figure 6b. However, the time when OPEC takes over the
                                                    
23 The absolute cartelisation gains are reduced by 94.5 per cent compared to the reference scenario.
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dominance of the market, and enjoys the benefits from cartelisation, is postponed by one period. This
implies that the gains from cartelisation in future periods do not outweigh the costs from restricting
supply and foregoing revenue in earlier periods when the fringe has such considerable reserves.
Hence, OPEC is in fact better off acting as a price taker in this scenario.
We conclude this section by stating that the amount of reserves in non-OPEC is of major importance
for the cartelisation gains to OPEC. This conclusion is strengthened by the results of SCEN 10-13, see
Table 1. They state that when we combine increases in the fringe reserves with increases in the
discount rate or the rate of technological progress, the reserve amount is clearly the most important
factor. This might imply that increases in the level of exploration activity outside OPEC is the type of
fringe behaviour most inductive to the disintegration of OPEC.
6. The effects of moves by consumer countries
The cartelisation gains to OPEC are not only dependent on the behaviour of other oil producers, but
also by moves on the demand side, e.g., taken by consumer countries. One such move may be the
introduction of carbon taxes in order to curb the emissions of CO2. Another step could be to invest
R&D in energy savings equipment or alternative energy supply sources in order to be less dependent
on oil. In this section we look at the significance of such moves for the oil wealth of OPEC and for the
cartelisation gains. The results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. OPEC’s oil wealth and cartelisation gains with different moves by consumer countries
Scenario Parameter1 OPEC oil wealth in billion $ Cartelisation
gains (per cent)
CO22 Y13 Nash Cournot
model
Competitive
model
Reference/competitive
scenario 0 0.5 4,030 3,431 17.5
SCEN 14 10 3,121 2,581 20.9
SCEN 15 25 1,979 1,662 19.1
SCEN 16 35 1,461 1,266 15.3
SCEN 17 0.4 3,873 3,307 17.1
SCEN 18 0.2 3,591 3,027 18.6
SCEN 19 0.0 3,353 2,804 19.6
1
 We enter the parameter estimates only where they differ from the reference scenario assumptions.
2
 CO2 - global carbon tax in $ per barrel of oil equivalent
3
 Y1 - income elasticity of fossil fuels in the OECD area
6.1. Introduction of global carbon taxes
The threat of global warming is becoming more and more topical (IPCC 1995), and the implication of
this may be an international agreement to curb the emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. One
of several strategies to curb such emissions could be to introduce international carbon taxes on the
consumption of fossil fuels. An interesting question, then, is whether such a move could alter the
cartelisation gains to OPEC. One possibility could in fact be that the gains become so small that OPEC
breaks down, implying that the production of oil, and thus the emissions of CO2, accelerates.
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We introduce global carbon taxes in the range $10-35 per barrel of oil, where the tax is put on the
fossil fuels according to their carbon content. As one would guess, this reduces the oil wealth of OPEC
dramatically, see Table 2 (SCEN 14-16). However, the effect on the cartelisation gains to OPEC is
ambiguous, as the reduction in oil wealth is big in the competitive model, too. Still, even though the
relative cartelisation gains are only partly changed, OPEC’s oil wealth diminishes so much that the
absolute level of cartelisation gains is considerably reduced. Hence, although there has not become
more to gain by leaving the cartel, the benefits of sustaining the cartel are reduced in this scenario. If
there are fixed costs unaccounted for by maintaining the organisation, the introduction of large carbon
taxes may thus have adverse effects on the unity of OPEC.
6.2. Changes in income elasticities in the OECD area
There are much debate about energy savings and research in alternative energy sources in several
OECD-countries. Several explanations could be mentioned for this attention. The traditional argument
in favour of such strategies has been related to the availability of oil reserves; both the fact that oil is
an exhaustible resource, and that the major stocks of these resources are situated in a politically
unstable area. In recent years the focus on air pollution has also called attention to the negative
externalities of consuming fossil fuels.
If these factors induce the OECD countries to more actively encourage energy savings or research in
alternative energy sources, the income elasticities of oil, and probably other fossil fuels, may decrease
in the OECD area from its current level.24 Hence, we would like to study the impact of this on the oil
wealth of OPEC. In the reference scenario the income elasticities in the OECD area were assumed to
be 0.5 for alle three fossil fuels. In Table 2 (SCEN 17-19) results are presented for income elasticities
of fossil fuels in the range 0.4-0.0.25 Again, OPEC’s oil wealth is negatively affected in both models.
The oil price is reduced, and the production profile of OPEC is decreased, especially in the midterm
period from 2020 to 2050, when the energy savings have become more effectual. In the final periods,
when the maximum producer price is reached and the reserves have diminished, production lasts
somewhat longer since unit costs are lower due to less accumulated production.
Nevertheless, the impacts on OPEC’s oil wealth are not as dramatic as with, e.g., large carbon taxes,
see Table 2. Moreover, the cartelisation gains are almost unchanged, both in relative and absolute
terms. Although the energy savings mainly affect the later periods, when OPEC dominates the market
as a cartel, and not the early periods, which would be dominated by the OPEC-countries if the market
were competitive, the profits of sustaining the cartel have in fact not decreased. There are two possible
explanations for this. First, the intertemporal feature of the model ensures that negative effects on the
profitability in the future also affect earlier periods, as there is a wish to increase present production,
which in turn depresses the initial price level. Second, although the midterm periods seem to be more
important for OPEC as a cartel than if the market were competitive, the marginal profits of one unit
may not be different. This is also particularly related to the intertemporal aspect. As production is
reduced by almost the same magnitude in the midterm periods in both models, the impacts on the oil
wealth may be quite similar. Thus, we may conclude that encouraging energy savings in the OECD
area will not lead to any break up of OPEC.
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 Intensified research in alternative energy sources may also increase the rate of technological change in the
backstop technology.
25
 In each scenario the income elasticities of the three fossil fuels are assumed to be identical in the OECD-area.
The results are more or less the same if only the income elasticity of oil is changed, with income elasticity of gas
and coal being the same as in the reference scenario.
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7. Conclusions
In this study we have found that there are still positive cartelisation gains to OPEC in the oil market,
despite the combination of a relatively small market share to the cartel and low prices compared to
earlier decades. More specifically, our results indicate that OPEC’s oil wealth is about 18 per cent
higher than it would have been if the cartel didn’t exist, i.e., if the market were competitive. However,
these gains may be considered as quite modest compared to the 1970s, when Pindyck (1978)
calculated the gains to be at least 50-100 per cent.
The paper has also focused on different moves taken by non-OPEC producers or consumer countries
which could lead to major reductions in the oil wealth of OPEC. In general, we find that these moves
nevertheless do not alter the relative size of the cartelisation gains to OPEC significantly. This
conclusion applies to the effects of higher discount rates (through privatisation or the acute need for
current revenue) and more rapid technological progress on the supply side, as well as the introduction
of global carbon taxes and increased energy savings on the demand side. However, as the oil wealth is
reduced, so is the absolute value of the cartelisation gains, which implies that the monetary benefits of
maintaining the cartel diminish.
The only move that significantly alters the relative cartelisation gains to OPEC, seems to be increases
in the oil reserves in non-OPEC. If increased exploration activity leads to an increase in non-OPEC
reserves of 25 per cent, we find that the relative cartelisation gains to OPEC are almost halved.
Moreover, doubling the reserves implies that the cartelisation gains completely vanish, and in fact
become negative. This confirms the theoretical result by Ulph and Folie (1978) that a cartel may be
worse off in an open-loop Nash equilibrium than in a competitive market.
Although the relevance of this last scenario may be discussed, it points to the risk that seemingly
rational exploration activity may in the end be severely detrimental for the producers if the total
exploration activities in non-OPEC are massive. This risk is strengthened by the fact that OPEC
consists of several heterogeneous member countries, so that positive cartelisation gains for the cartel
as a whole may not be sufficient to prevent a dissolution of the cartel.
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Appendix 1
In the model there are three fossil fuels produced: Oil (O), natural gas (G) and coal (K). We consider
the model of the world oil market with OPEC as a cartel (C) and a competitive fringe (F). Consumers
are situated in three regions: OECD-Europe (1), Rest-OECD (2), and Non-OECD (3). There is a
natural gas market with perfect competition in each region, and the coal market is assumed to be a
competitive world market.
All variables are functions of time. However we will suppress the time notation in the following. The
functional forms are constant over time.
1. List of symbols
PO international producer price of oil
PK international producer price of coal
PG
i producer price of natural gas in region i, i=1,2,3
Q ji consumer price of fuel j in region i, i=1,2,3
P international backstop price
z j
i
unit costs of transportation, distribution and refining of fuel j in region i, i=1,2,3
v j
i
existing taxes on fuel j in region i
Yi gross national income in region i
x j
k production of fuel j by producer k
X j
i
consumption of fuel j in region i
A j
k
accumulated production of fuel j by producer k
A jk accumulated production of fuel j by producer k over the entire time horizon
C j
k
unit cost of production of fuel j for producer k
λ the shadow cost associated with cumulative extraction up to the current time
π j
k
scarcity rent in production of fuel j for producer k
MRC marginal revenue of OPEC
τ γ ψk i, , rate of technological change in production of oil, gas and coal respectively
µ rate of technological change in backstop technology
η jk parameter of convexity in the cost function for fuel j for producer k
a b c dj
i
j
i
j
i
j
i
, , , price and income elasticities in demand function for fuel j in region i
ω j
i
constant in demand function for fuel j in region i
α β σ θ, , ,i constants in cost functions
κ initial backstop price
r discount rate
t time
Tj
k last period of production of fuel j for producer k
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2. Demand
On the demand side we assume loglinear demand functions in all regions. Demand takes into account
the imperfect substitution possibility between the different fossil fuels.
First, let X j
i∧
 be defined by
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Then the demand for energy type j in region i is given by
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The restriction of market clearing in the world oil market can then be written
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=
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From (A1)-(A4), we can derive the producer price of oil:
(A5)  ( )P P x x z v z v z v Q Q Q Q Q Q P Y Y YO O OC OF O O O O O O K K K G G G= + + + +, , , , , , , , , , , , ,1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
In a similar way, we can derive the producer prices of natural gas and coal.
3. The optimisation problem for OPEC in the Nash-Cournot model
When the oil market is modelled as a Nash-Cournot model, the cartel (OPEC) is facing a downward
sloping demand schedule at each point of time, and takes the extraction path of the fringe as given.
OPEC seeks to maximise the present value of the net revenue flow. The control variable in the
optimisation problem is the extraction path of the cartel, and the state variable is accumulated
production. PO ( )⋅⋅  in (A6) is the producer price given in (A5).
(A6)  [ ]max ( )
x
O O
C
O
C rt
O
C
P C x e dt⋅⋅ − ⋅ −
∞∫
0
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s.t.
(A7)  A xOC OC
•
=
(A8)  xOC ≥ 0
(A9)  C eOC A tO
C
O
C C
=
−α η τ
(A10) P e t= −κ µ
4. Solving the problem
The current value Hamiltonian in the optimisation problem of OPEC, Hc, is given by
(A11)  ( ) ( )[ ]H P C A t x xc O OC OC OC OC= ⋅ − +, λ
where λt (<0) is the shadow cost associated with cumulative extraction up to time t. The scarcity rent
for the cartel is defined as π λOC t t= − .
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are given by the Pontryagin’s maximum principle.
From this maximum principle we get the time path of the shadow cost
(A12)  λ λ ∂
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(A12) can be rewritten using the definition of the scarcity rent
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 maximises the Hamiltonian for all xO
C ≥ 0  which for an interior solution requires
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which gives the producer price of oil when OPEC produces
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 is the cartel rent. The marginal revenue of OPEC is defined as
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Using (A13) and (A16) we find the time path of the marginal revenue
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(A17)  MR r CC OC C OC
•
= −π τ
The cartel will stop producing at time ( )TOC ∈ ∞0, when the unit cost reaches the backstop price
minus region specific costs and taxes. Let AOC  be the aggregate production of OPEC over the entire
time horizon. The transversality condition is then
(A18) ( )max( ) ,
i T O
i
O
i
O
C
O
C
O
CP z v C A T
O
C − − =
5. The optimisation problem for the competitive fringe
The optimisation problem of a competitive fringe producer in the oil market is similar to the one of
OPEC above, with the exception of the producer price which is regarded exogenously. In a
competitive market, the optimisation problem of OPEC producers is again similar to this.
(A19)  [ ]max
x
O O
F
O
F rt
O
F
P C x e dt− ⋅ −
∞∫
0
s.t.
(A20)  A xOF OF
•
=
(A21)  xOF ≥ 0
(A22)  C eOF A tO
F
O
F F
=
−β η τ
From the first order conditions of this maximisation problem, we get for an interior solution
(A23)  ( )P C A tO OF OF OF= +, π
(A24)  ( )P rP r C r CO O F OF OF F OF• = − + = −τ π τ
where πO
F
 is the scarcity rent for the fringe defined as the negative of the shadow cost associated with
cumulative extraction.
In a market equilibrium, OPEC’s first order and transversality conditions as well as the market
condition (A4) and the development in the backstop price (A10) must be satisfied.
The transversality condition of the fringe, where ( )TOF ∈ ∞0, , is
(A25)  ( )max( ) ,
i T O
i
O
i
O
F
O
F
O
FP z v C A T
O
F − − =
6. The optimisation problems in the natural gas markets
As in the oil market, the gas producers also maximise the present value of the net revenue flow. We
consider three separate regional natural gas markets with perfect competition. There are similar
restrictions and first order conditions for the optimisation problems for all markets i=1,2,3. Each
producer faces the following optimisation problem:
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(A26)  [ ]max
x
G
i
G
i
G
i rt
G
i
P C x e dt− ⋅ −
∞∫
0
s.t.
(A27)  A xGi Gi
•
=
(A28)  xGi ≥ 0
(A29)  C eGi i A tG
i
G
i i
=
−σ η γ
The first order conditions give
(A30)  ( )P C A tGi Gi Gi i Gi= +, ,γ π
(A31)  ( )P rP r C r CGi Gi i Gi Gi i Gi• = − + = −γ π γ
In a market equilibrium the development of the backstop price (A10) and the market condition (A32)
must hold.
(A32)  ( )P P x z v Q Q P YGi Gi Gi Gi Gi Oi Ki i= +, , , , ,
The transversality conditions in the natural gas markets, where ( )TGi ∈ ∞0, , are similarly
(A33)  ( )P z v C A TT Gi Gi Gi Gi GiGi − − = ,
7. The optimisation problem in the coal market
We assume that there is one global coal market with perfect competition. Since the coal resources in
the world are so huge compared to those of oil and gas, we ignore the dynamic aspect of the resource
extraction and treat the optimisation problem in the coal market as a static problem, where the coal
producers maximise the profit in every period. Each producer faces the following problem:
(A34)  [ ]max
x
K K K
rt
K
P C x e dt− ⋅ −
∞∫
0
s.t.
(A35)  xK ≥ 0
(A36)  C eK t= −θ ψ
The unit cost in coal production is assumed to be independent of accumulated production. The first
order condition is simply,
(A37)  P CK K=
In a market equilibrium, (A10) and the market condition (A38) must hold.
(A38)  ( )P P x z v z v z v Q Q Q Q Q Q P Y Y YK K K K K K K K K O O O G G G= + + +, , , , , , , , , , , , ,1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
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The transversality condition, where ( )TK ∈ ∞0, , is
(A39)  max( ) ( )
i T K
i
K
i
K KP z v C TK − − =
